By Sir Ronald Sanders
The situation in Haiti is worsening, and the ordinary people of Haiti—already among the most impoverished in the Western Hemisphere—are its most tragic victims. They continue to exist, barely, in conditions of extreme poverty, rampant violence, and diminishing hope for a better life.
Over the last three years, the rise of armed gangs—now controlling more than 80 percent of Port-au-Prince and extending their influence beyond—has made life in Haiti increasingly intolerable. As the machinery of governance and law enforcement in the country has eroded, these gangs have filled the void with terror and impunity. Presently, at least 1.3 million people are displaced within Haiti’s borders. The scale of the security and humanitarian crisis is catastrophic and worsening.
A recent report by Haiti’s leading independent human rights watchdog, the National Human Rights Defence Network (RNDDH), outlines this dire situation with stark clarity. Titled “Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country”, the April 2025 report paints a bleak picture. Since the installation of the unelected Presidential Transition Council (CPT) in April 2024, RNDDH has recorded thirteen massacres and dozens of armed attacks. From April 2024 to March 2025 alone, 4,405 people were murdered—805 of them in just the first three months of 2025. More than 3,700 women were subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, including nearly 1,900 cases of rape or sexual assault.
The RNDDH report is particularly critical of Haiti’s governance. It notes that only one of the thirteen documented massacres led to any form of prosecution. Complaints from victims remain unaddressed. Haiti’s prisons are overcrowded by more than 82 percent, and its court system is in disarray, with some judges operating from a makeshift house after fleeing areas overtaken by gangs. The report is unequivocal in its conclusion: the CPT has deepened, rather than alleviated, the country’s descent into violence, corruption, and institutional breakdown.
While the Haitian people are caught in this maelstrom, the international community remains fragmented and largely ineffective. The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly renewed the mandate of the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission to support Haiti’s stabilization efforts. However, with approximately 1,000 personnel on the ground and inadequate funding, the operation is hamstrung. The US and Brazil have advocated for transforming this effort into a full-fledged UN peacekeeping mission. But China and Russia have blocked such a move, revealing the systemic paralysis at the heart of the Security Council.
As a result, the MSS is running on fumes—willing, perhaps, but not resourced or structured to be truly effective. Its Kenyan leadership is confronting a scale of violence and sophistication among Haiti’s gangs that vastly outmatches the mission’s capacity.
In a highly controversial development, the CPT has reportedly hired a private security company led by US citizen Erik Prince—founder of the infamous Blackwater group—to carry out targeted operations against the gangs. Reports suggest that Prince’s operatives have been using kamikaze drones since March 2025 to assassinate gang leaders. While some sources claim that a significant number of high-ranking gang members have been killed, there is no independent verification of these claims.
More alarmingly, the gangs have begun to hide themselves within local communities to evade drone strikes, exposing innocent civilians to the risk of being killed. Experts warn that it is only a matter of time before these heavily armed and well-resourced groups—already possessing superior firepower to the Haitian National Police—acquire and deploy drones of their own. The trend of non-state actors using commercially available drones in other conflict zones underscores the risk of a massive and destructive escalation in Haiti’s already dire security crisis.
In the face of this spiralling crisis, the new Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Albert Ramdin, has proposed a fresh approach. In his inaugural address on May 30, Ramdin called for a new strategy to address the interlinked security, humanitarian, and political crises in Haiti. He hopes that stakeholders can significantly improve the security situation and organize a constitutional referendum before February 2026, when the mandate of the CPT expires.
The Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank, asked me to comment on the feasibility of this vision. My answer was clear:
“What is certain is that, without a significant use of force to dislodge the gangs’ stranglehold in Haiti, security will not improve, nor will a constitutional referendum occur by February 2026. However, such a force is most unlikely. The UN Security Council would not authorise it, and the OAS Charter does not permit it. So, Secretary-General Ramdin is right to pursue a new strategy.
Any realistic strategy must face this central reality: the gangs have a strong and determinative presence, with substantial firepower and almost no incentive to disarm unilaterally. A greater realism is required. This demands cooperation among the UN and OAS Secretaries-General, key UN Security Council members, and the Haitian Transitional Council to establish a short-term stabilization plan in conjunction with a long-term economic transformation agenda. The short-term plan must provide targeted support to strengthen Haitian institutions, particularly the Haitian National Police, and bolster any feasible international security mission.
Essentially, the strategy must also involve engagement with gang leadership, not to give them a share in power, but to provide them with incentives to cooperate in establishing the rule of law. History shows that dialogue, however difficult, has helped to resolve internal conflicts; without it, the status quo will persist.”
Some may recoil at the notion of engaging criminal gangs in dialogue. However, at least two Caribbean leaders have publicly acknowledged the necessity of such an approach, and others have done so privately. The hard truth is that, with the UN Security Council unwilling to act decisively, and the US increasingly financing Haiti’s security in an ad hoc manner, a dangerous vacuum has emerged in international support for resolving the crisis.
Haiti’s internal governance failures cannot be addressed solely by force. What was once unimaginable must now be seriously considered. That includes unconventional diplomacy, direct engagement, and regional leadership to fill the vacuum of international will.
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