By Joseph Black
India’s recent diplomatic overtures towards China – framed in both Indian and Chinese media as a potential ‘thaw’ – have prompted speculation about whether a reset in bilateral relations is underway. However, much of this speculation is itself premature and overly determinist. While it is true that India has signalled an interest to engage with China on trade, tourism and people-to-people exchanges, interpreting this as a shift away from strategic competition towards long-term partnership is misguided.
Over recent weeks, Chinese state media – particularly the Global Times—has consistently produced stories suggesting that India is ‘seeking closer ties’ with China, driven in part by mounting pressure from the United States, especially regarding tariffs. It is noteworthy, however, that this narrative is largely coming from Chinese propaganda outlets, rather than the Indian government or its own independent media ecosystem. While Beijing might well want to project a vision of a more malleable India, the reality is much more complex.
Yes, Indian policymakers have reportedly been discussing the easing of restrictions imposed in the wake of the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, including the resumption of visas and flights. But it is worth remembering that India is not doing this out of desperation or withdrawal. Rather, these actions are pragmatic – perhaps even transactional – and aimed at securing tactical benefits in an increasingly unstable global economy. India stands to benefit from diversifying trade avenues, mitigating inflationary pressures and deepening domestic industrial competitiveness. Better relations with China can serve these purposes – but only up to a certain point.
This balancing act reveals a deeper truth: India is not trying to become China’s friend as much as it is trying to become China’s rival.
India’s ambition to position itself as a credible alternative to China in global manufacturing, supply chains and geopolitical leadership is no secret. It continues to court Western investment (India and the UK being ‘closer than ever’ to a free trade deal – highly significant given India’s historically protectionist stance), bolster its ‘Make in India’ campaign, and attract offshoring from multinational companies wary of overreliance on China – even if it has allowed a US$23 billion incentive scheme aimed at rivalling Chinese factories to quietly lapse. It is not lost on New Delhi that global firms are increasingly seeking a ‘China + 1’ strategy, and India is keen to be the ‘ + 1’.
Yet India’s internal challenges complicate this ambition. There remains a pronounced disjunction between its states in terms of regulatory regimes, infrastructure readiness and ease of doing business. While Karnataka and Tamil Nadu may offer world-class industrial parks and logistics networks, other states lag far behind. Political assertiveness on the global stage – evident in recent tensions with Canada and the UK – may also undermine India’s long-term credibility as a stable partner.
Furthermore, India has shown no signs of softening its stance on its territorial disputes with China. Despite the media’s focus on the resumption of border patrols and diplomatic niceties at summits, India has remained firm on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), continued to build infrastructure in sensitive areas, and kept high-level military talks ongoing. These are not the actions of a state capitulating to Beijing’s overtures – they are the behaviours of a state that is hedging.
Moreover, India’s continued engagement with the Quad (alongside the US, Japan and Australia), even if it is currently not willing to engage in a military alliance with other Quad members, underscores its commitment to a multipolar Indo-Pacific order. Participation in the Quad is not simply a performative gesture; it signals India’s deepening strategic convergence with like-minded countries who view China’s assertiveness with growing alarm. India may seek improved relations with Beijing, but not at the cost of weakening the very partnerships that bolster its global standing.
There is, to be sure, space for calibrated cooperation. India and China have shared interests in multilateral fora such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and both resist what they perceive as Western moralism in international affairs. Their positions on sovereignty, development and global economic reform often converge. But even here, India’s engagement is selective and guided by realpolitik rather than idealism.
The more pressing question, then, is why certain media outlets have been so eager to proclaim a thaw. In part, this could stem from a tendency to overstate the significance of diplomatic symbolism. A photo-op between prime minister Narendra Modi and president Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit or a few resumed flights do not indicate a geopolitical sea change. There also appears to be a broader effort, especially from China’s global media arms, to shape discourse in a way that weakens international coalitions designed to balance Beijing’s influence. By projecting an image of growing closeness with India, Chinese outlets aim to dissuade Washington and its allies from investing further in Delhi as a strategic partner.
- [This is an excerpt from an article in The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs and Policy Studies. Opinions expressed do not reflect the position of the Round Table editorial board.]
Joseph Black is with the War Studies Department, King’s College London and the Women’s Studies Center, Chiang Mai University.
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