By Sir Ronald Sanders
In the latest round of barbs with which Venezuela has responded to events surrounding its claim to the Essequibo region of Guyana, Guyana’s president, Irfaan Ali, was described as “the Zelensky of the Caribbean.” This characterization begs the question: If Ali is the “Zelensky of the Caribbean,” then who is the “Putin”?
However, posing and answering that latter question is as unhelpful to resolving the border controversy peacefully as is describing Ali as “Zelensky.” It is far more constructive to focus on facts and to work toward a peaceful solution to Venezuela’s claims in accordance with the UN Charter and international law.
The most recent incident that inflamed the situation between the two countries occurred on 1 March 2025, when a Venezuelan military vessel approached and accosted Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) platforms, operated by the US company Exxon, in an area that Guyana considers its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It is important to note that, because of the land boundary contention still before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Guyana and Venezuela have not yet formally delimited their maritime boundaries.
Both countries claim the waters in question. However, under a December 2023 Order of the ICJ, Guyana has administrative control over the disputed territory pending the Court’s final judgment. Consequently, Guyana is entitled to authorize lawful activities in the EEZ, including those undertaken by the FPSO platforms operated by Exxon.
While the right of navigation through contested waters is recognized under customary international law, that right does not extend to confronting or intimidating entities engaged in legally authorized activity. Although the Venezuelan patrol boat did not use force, its actions arguably violated the spirit of both the ICJ’s 1 December 2023 Order and Clauses 1 and 6 of the Argyle Agreement, which collectively demand that neither side take steps that might aggravate or extend the dispute.
Hence, instead of exploring the implications of who is a “Zelensky” or a “Putin” in this matter, it is far more constructive for the government and peoples of both countries to maintain their focus on the arbitration of the controversy before the ICJ. At the same time, they should abide by the terms of “The Joint Declaration of Argyle for Dialogue and Peace” (the Argyle Agreement), which they signed on 14 December 2023.
In adhering to the Argyle Agreement, Venezuela should recall Clause 1, which states that both parties agreed “directly or indirectly” not to threaten or use force under any circumstances, and Clause 6, which states that both parties committed to “refrain from escalating any conflict or disagreement arising from any controversy between them.”
In this regard, the Venezuelan authorities should reflect on whether taking over Ankoko Island (divided between the two countries) and placing military assets on it constitutes a threat of the use of force. Consideration might also be given to Venezuela’s declared intent to hold local elections on 27 April 2025 in Guyana’s Essequibo region, asserting it as “Guayana-Esequiba,” complete with a parallel governance structure—an action that directly challenges Guyana’s sovereignty.
The leaders of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries have publicly described these plans a breach of international norms and of the ICJ’s provisional measures. Importantly, CARICOM has not forcibly inserted itself into the border issue. Instead, both the governments of Venezuela and Guyana solicit CARICOM’s mediating role, and to the credit of its leaders and the Secretariat’s staff, the organization has tried to play a steadying role. It is all the more unfortunate, therefore, that the Venezuelan vice president labelled officials of the CARICOM Secretariat as “third-rank bureaucrats of CARICOM, who act behind the backs of heads of government.” Anyone who knows how the Secretariat operates would confirm that it issues no public statement without the unanimous support of CARICOM governments.
Following the 1 March incident involving the Venezuelan military vessel and the FPSOs, Guyana’s president reported the matter to the Interlocutors of the Argyle Agreement, seeking “appropriate” action. In response—and while affirming in a 1 March 2025 statement that “The Essequibo is and will remain an inseparable part of Venezuela”—the Venezuelan foreign minister added that Venezuela will urgently activate the Argyle Mechanism to pursue peaceful dialogue.
Thus, president Nicolás Maduro requested an immediate meeting with president Ali under the chairmanship of the Argyle Interlocutors. For his part, while stating that he remains “fully committed to dialogue, particularly when it serves to reinforce international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” president Ali proposed a preparatory meeting of the two countries’ foreign ministers.
President Ali’s proposal is wise—not only because it allows time to diffuse heightened emotions ignited by recent events, but also because it permits careful preparation for such an important encounter.
Ultimately, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have committed themselves to remain a Zone of Peace. By respecting the ICJ’s judgment on the border contention, once it is delivered, and the guiding principles of international law, Guyana and Venezuela can resolve their differences to the benefit of their peoples and regional stability.
A lasting solution lies not in epithets over who is the “Caribbean Zelensky” or “Putin,” but in deference to the legal frameworks upon which the peace and prosperity of all nations depend.
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